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In 2002, twenty-year-old Evance Moyo was convicted of murder 
and sentenced “at the pleasure of the President” in the High Court of 
Malawi for a crime he committed in 1997 while he was sixteen years 
old.1 While attending a party, Moyo stabbed and killed Moses 
Chibwana during a fight involving friends from both sides.2 Moyo 
was arrested and remanded at Chichiri Maximum Prison alongside 
adults wherein he remained incarcerated following his conviction in 
a 2002 trial.3 Under Section 26(2) of the Penal Code (Cap 7:01) and 
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 1. Moyo v. Att’y Gen. (2007) Cons. Case No. 12 (Malawi). 
 2. Id. at 3. 
 3. Id. 
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Section 11(1) of the then Children and Young Persons Act of 1969 
(Cap 26:03) of the Laws of Malawi, children convicted of homicide 
were sentenced “during the President’s pleasure.”4 The trial judge 
ordered that Moyo be sent to an approved school,5 but he was 
nonetheless sent to Chichiri prison where he remained alongside 
adult prisoners.  
With the help of human rights organizations, Moyo applied to the 
Constitutional Court for a determination that his constitutional rights 
as a child “to treatment consistent with the special needs of children” 
and to “be imprisoned only as a last resort and for the shortest period 
of time” had been violated by keeping him on remand in an adult 
prison from 1997 to 2002 while still a juvenile and incarcerated for 
nearly eleven years.6 Among other things, Moyo sought to declare 
sentences “at the pleasure of the President” unconstitutional based on 
the fact that sentencing is an integral part of a trial and cannot be 
independent if the President dictates the sentence. In its judgment, 
the Court focused on whether a sentence “at the pleasure of the 
President” constitutes a mandatory life sentence and concluded that it 
did not, but “rather can be equated to an indeterminate sentence 
which cannot be held to be unconstitutional.”7 Despite 
acknowledging that Moyo’s remand and incarceration in adult prison 
for years was in blatant disregard of his welfare, his special needs as 
a juvenile, and his best interests, the court refused to make an order 
for compensation, saying the incarceration was a function of poor 
implementation of the court’s judgment.8 Such is the plight of 
children who find themselves in conflict with the law.   
Among the many protections in the Convention on the Rights of 
 
 4. Id. at 7. 
 5. At the approved school, a “board of visitors” would have assessed his 
progress and rehabilitation so as to make an informed decision about when he 
should be released.  Id. at 7-8. 
 6. See id. at 2 (explaining that the Court must consider whether Moyo’s 
incarceration  was a violation of Section 42(2)(g)(iii) of the Constitution, Article 3 
of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and Section 31 of the Children and 
Young Persons Act). 
 7. Id. at 8. 
 8. See id. at 8 (determining that the system ignored its statutory duty because 
when a court sentences a juvenile to be held at the pleasure of the President, the 
law mandates that the juvenile’s case be reviewed so that he can be released at any 
stage depending on the recommendation made to the President, which did not 
occur in Moyo’s case). 
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the Child (“CRC” or “Convention”)9, those pertaining to justice for 
children seem to be the most curtailed worldwide, despite effort in 
the international arena to develop safeguards in the field of child 
justice.10 Nonetheless, it is evident that things are changing for the 
better in most places. The 1969 Act under which Moyo was 
sentenced has since been replaced by the Child Care, Protection and 
Justice Act,11 which does not bear any provision of sentencing 
children at the pleasure of the President. Even though this sentence 
still exists under the Penal Code, it is evident that the new Act 
provides more protection for children.12 This as well as other 
safeguards developing for children in Malawi and other nations bear 
testimony to the fact that children’s rights have become an accepted 
phenomenon, even where children are in conflict with the law. 
However, as observed by the Africa Child Policy Forum (“ACPF”), 
“while there has been progress in developing appropriate measures 
for children, there are still significant gaps in dealing with children in 
the criminal justice system.”13  The United Nations (“UN”) has said 
that there need not be “a duality between human rights and juvenile 
justice,”14 and that restorative justice is the best way to deal with 
children in conflict with the law in a manner that ably respects 
children’s rights as well as promotes justice in society. This is 
 
 9. See generally Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 3, opened for 
signature Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990) 
[hereinafter CRC] (identifying the rights of children and mandating that states 
parties implement them). 
 10. Odongo Godfrey Odhiambo, The Domestication of International Law 
Standards on the Rights of the Child with Specific Reference to Juvenile Justice in 
the African Context 7 (Oct. 18, 2005) (unpublished L.L.D. thesis, University of the 
Western Cape), available at http://etd.uwc.ac.za/usrfiles/modules/etd/docs/ 
etd_init_9110_1176963955.pdf. 
 11. See Malawi Parliament Passes Child Care, Protection and Justice Bill, 
NETNEWSPUBLISHER (June 29, 2010), http://www.netnewspublisher.com/malawi-
parliament-passes-child-care-protection-and-justice-bill/ (explaining that the bill 
seeks to improve problems of child trafficking and abduction, as well as recognize 
principles of the Convention on the Rights of the Child). 
 12. Child Care, Protection, and Justice Act No. 22 of 2010 (Malawi). 
 13. AFR. CHILD POLICY FORUM, REALISING RIGHTS FOR CHILDREN: 
HARMONISATION OF LAWS ON CHILDREN EASTERN AND SOUTHERN ASIA 6 (2007), 
available at http://www.sarpn.org/documents/d0002744/ACPF_children_rights 
.pdf. 
 14. GERALDINE VAN BUEREN, THE UNITED NATIONS AND JUVENILE JUSTICE: A 
GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AND BEST PRACTICE, at 8, U.N. Doc. 
ST/ESA.SER.M/49-50, U.N. Sales No. E.99.IV.7 (1999). 
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evidenced by the jurisprudential developments in the international 
framework for child justice which, while recognizing that “mankind 
owes to the child, the best it has to give,”15 has culminated into the 
principle of “the best interests of the child.”16  Regarding the purpose 
of child justice, the philosophy has moved from merely reclaiming 
the delinquent child to restoring children in conflict with the law.17 
The difference being that “reclaiming,” meaning “retrieve,” 
“recover,” or “repossess,” is more limited than “restoring,” which 
has elements of reinstating, re-establishment and repair.18 
Why then has the idea of human rights for children been important 
in the field of child justice? A report of one of the general 
discussions of the Committee on the Rights of the Child 
acknowledges that “the police officer or judge who took the decision 
to keep a youth in prison instead of returning him immediately to his 
parents assumed a heavy responsibility and the direction of an entire 
life might depend on a decision that was usually taken a few hours 
after the youth had been stopped in the street.”19  This explains the 
need to “minimize the contact of children with the criminal justice 
system at all levels and this necessitates the importance of the 
traditional justice system in improving the situation of children in 
conflict with the law.”20 The fresh influence of restorative justice has 
arguably been most effective in the arena of child justice.21 It is 
 
 15. Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child ¶ 3, Sept. 26, 1924, 
[hereinafter Declaration of the Rights of the Child] available at http://www.un-
documents.net/gdrc1924.htm. 
 16. CRC, supra note 9, at art. 3. 
 17. See U.N. Human Rights Council [UNHRC], Human Rights in the 
Administration of Justice, in Particular 
Juvenile Justice, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/10/L.15 (Mar. 20, 2009) (calling upon 
states to prevent and address juvenile delinquency using inter alia restorative 
justice). 
    18. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 1896, 1936 (3d ed. 1993). 
 19. U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child [C.R.C.], 10th Sess., 254th mtg. 
¶ 2, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/SR.254 (Nov. 17, 1995). 
 20. Id. at ¶ 11. 
 21. See UNICEF Welcomes Signing of Child Justice Bill into Law, UNICEF 
(May 18, 2009), http://www.unicef.org/media/media_49695.html (explaining that 
restorative justice is more effective than “retributive” approaches because 
restorative justice encourages the child offender, the victim, the families, and the 
community to work together to repair harm done and prevent further criminal acts, 
rather than focusing solely on punishment); cf. Ann Skelton, For the Next 
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recommended that states “adopt and encourage restorative justice 
and rehabilitation schemes for child offenders, focusing on diversion 
from the criminal justice system at all stages.”22 On the outset, let it 
be explained that while the terminologies of “juvenile justice” and 
“youth justice” have been the dominant terms in most places, 
especially in the West, the current trend, especially in Africa, is to 
use the term “child justice.”23 “Child justice” is the preferred term in 
this paper, although both terms will be used interchangeably when 
necessary, especially when referring to international documents and 
jurisdictions that use the term “juvenile” or “youth.” 
The UN has highlighted the seriousness of the problem of juvenile 
delinquency and youth crime in a number of its Congress meetings.24 
Child-perpetrated crimes have been on the rise.25 Child offenders are 
dealt with in a wide range of ways from place to place.26 Also, there 
are major practical and theoretical differences between systems and 
countries regarding the minimum age of criminal responsibility,27 
depending on how a particular society views the developmental 
 
Generations: Remaking South Africa’s Juvenile Justice System, in TO REPAIR THE 
IRREPARABLE: REPARATION AND RECONSTRUCTION IN SOUTH AFRICA 211, 215 
(Erik Doxtader & Charles Villa-Vicencio eds., 2004) (contrasting the Western 
world’s tough restorative justice approach to criminal behavior with the restorative 
justice model that was used in pre-colonial South Africa and to which South Africa 
is arguably returning; the restorative justice model emphasizes reconciliation, 
restitution, healing, and harmony). 
 22. AFR. CHILD POLICY FORUM, supra note 13, at 10. 
 23. For example, the United States uses the term “juvenile” while Canada, 
Australia, and New Zealand mainly use the term “youth justice.” 
 24. For example, the 8th and 9th U.N. National Congress on the Prevention of 
Crime and the Treatment of Offenders in 1990 and 1995, respectively. 
 25. See Anthony L. Pillay, Criminal Capacity in Children Accused of Murder: 
Challenges in the Forensic Mental Health Assessment, 18 J. CHILD. & 
ADOLESCENT MENTAL HEALTH 17, 17 (2006) (discussing children’s perpetration 
of violent crimes, particularly murder, and the role and challenges of forensic 
mental health assessments of children accused of murder). 
 26. See John A. Winterdyk, Introduction, in JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEMS: 
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES vii, xi (John A. Winterdyk ed., 1997) (comparing 
juvenile justice models between ten countries by analyzing differences in general 
features, key personnel and agencies, tasks, understanding of client behavior, 
purpose of intervention, and objectives and categorizing the countries on a 
continuum from “participatory” to “crime control”). 
 27. See id. at viii (contrasting the age at which children can be found guilty of 
an offense and the justification of each approach in the United Kingdom, the 
United States, and South Africa). 
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capacity of children to understand the societal prescripts of right and 
wrong and to act in accordance with that appreciation.28  The 
Committee on the Rights of the Child reiterates the indivisibility of 
rights, holistic implementation, and the concept of partnership and 
cooperation in realizing rights.29 “Political organization and systems 
of governance, as well as the social organization and economic 
situation of countries, have a bearing on their capacity and efforts to 
fulfill treaty obligations and realize the human rights of children”.30 
All these issues and more justify the need for a standardized way of 
dealing with children who find themselves in conflict with the law 
where the development of children’s rights and an international 
framework for child justice has been a key factor. 
When it comes to justice for children, there have been several 
shifts in the policy approaches since the nineteenth century. The 
child justice system internationally has developed from an initial 
welfarist approach, to a justice model, then to a rights-based 
approach, and now there is a shift towards a restorative model. The 
welfarist approach mainly operated until around the 1960s and it was 
based on the doctrine of parens patriae, considering the state as a 
“kind and just parent.”31 The “justice” model32 was based on a law 
and order agenda.33 Following this, perceptions of justice for children 
 
 28. See Pillay, supra note 25, at 18 (stating that the various definitions of 
“juvenile” or “young offender” are often influenced by “cultural, historical, 
political and social differences”). 
 29. See generally C.R.C., General Measures of Implementation for the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, U.N. Doc. CRC/GC/2003/5 (Nov. 27, 
2003) [hereinafter C.R.C., General Measures of Implementation] (assessing states 
parties’ measures of implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
and recommending approaches to further successful implementation of the 
Convention). 
 30. See Savitri Goonesekere, Law Reform and Children’s Rights in Plural 
Legal Systems: Some Experiences in Sub-Saharan Africa, in PROTECTING THE 
WORLD’S CHILDREN: IMPACT OF THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD 
IN DIVERSE LEGAL SYSTEMS 209, 214 (UNICEF 2007) (exploring the CRC’s 
unique feature that places obligations not only on states and their agencies, but also 
on non-state actors, and examining how political instability, internal conflict, and 
violence have affected children’s lives in Benin, Ghana, and Zimbabwe). 
 31. Ann Skelton, The Influence of the Theory and Practice of Restorative 
Justice in South Africa with Special Reference to Child Justice 260 (2005) 
(unpublished L.L.D. thesis, University of Pretoria) (on file with author) 
[hereinafter Skelton Thesis]. 
 32. Id. at 256. 
 33. Allison Morris & Henri Giller, Conclusion, in PROVIDING CRIMINAL 
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took a rights-based approach where competing interests were 
presented in terms of the cultural understanding of children as 
objects of rights and the modern understanding of children as 
subjects of rights. At the moment, most child justice jurisdictions are 
shifting to restorative justice, which among other things aims at 
involving the victim, the offender, and the community in dealing 
with crime, and strives for the reparation of harm and reintegration of 
the offender into society. Restorative justice is described as “a 
buzzword in progressive criminal justice reform throughout the 
world.”34 It is generally defined as “a process whereby all parties 
with a stake in a particular offence come together to resolve 
collectively how to deal with the aftermath of an offence and its 
implications for the future.”35 In a context where the public is 
expecting the criminal justice system to provide a remedy, restorative 
justice as an approach involves “giving communities a greater stake 
in justice.”36  
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO CHILD 
JUSTICE 
Sociologist Ellen Key predicted that the twentieth century would 
be a century of the child.37  The idea of rights for children accused of 
committing offenses, and of treating them differently from adults, 
has philosophical underpinnings, the origins of which can be traced 
to the welfare model and the justice model.38 Initially, a welfarist 
 
JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN 151, 153 (Morris & Giller eds., 1983). 
 34. Ann Skelton, Restorative Justice in Child Systems in Africa, in CHILDREN’S 
RIGHTS IN AFRICA: A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 129 (Julia Sloth-Nielsen ed., 2008). 
 35. Tony F. Marshall, The Evolution of Restorative Justice in Britain, 4 EUR. J. 
ON CRIM. POL’Y & RES. 22, 37 (1996). 
 36. See Ann Skelton, Setting Standards for Diversion, CHILD AND YOUTH 
CARE WORKERS ONLINE (June, 2001), http://www.cyc-net.org/cyc-online/cycol-
0601-skelton.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2011) (explaining that communities are 
more likely to take responsibiltiy and play an active role in raising children if they 
are given the opportunity to participate in justice outcomes). 
 37. Ann Skelton, Restorative Justice as a Unifying Force for Child Justice 
Theory and Practice, UNICEF http://www.unicef.org/tdad/4annskelton.pdf (last 




 38. Odhiambo, supra note 10. 
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approach was employed, as initiated by the United States, until the 
1960s when there was a shift towards a justice oriented model.39 The 
debate on these theories concentrates on western criminal law 
systems.40 Before the 18th century, childhood was not recognized as 
having special status at common law and age did not generally afford 
any special protection where children were charged with the 
commission of criminal offences. Children were theoretically subject 
to the same procedures and penalties as adults and little attempt was 
made to separate them from adults during incarceration.41 In 1835, 
the House of Lords Committee on Goals and Houses of Correction 
recommended the segregation of adult and child offenders, leading to 
the passing of the Parkhurst Act of 1838 and the setting up of a 
separate penitentiary for young offenders.42 Following this, reformist 
activity for separate institutions for children flourished such that at 
the end of the nineteenth century the first juvenile courts were 
established and institutions for young offenders were established as 
an alternative to deportation or imprisonment.43 These reforms were 
initiated by “child savers,” two of which introduced the first juvenile 
court in the world, namely Lucy Flower and Julia Lathrop.44  
There was an emerging idea that children should be treated 
 
 39. Skelton Thesis, supra note 31, at 256. 
 40. Odhiambo, supra note 10, at 5. 
 41. See Julia Sloth-Nielsen, Juvenile Justice 51-52 (2001) (unpublished L.L.D. 
thesis, University of the Western Cape), available at http://www.sloth-
nielsen.com/images/stories/uploader/juliathesisChapter_1.doc (explaining that 
although childhood was considered a mitigating factor during sentencing, children 
could be jailed with adults, flogged, and even executed as recently as the 
nineteenth century). 
 42. GILES PLAYFAIR, THE PUNITIVE OBSESSION: AN UNVARNISHED HISTORY 
OF THE ENGLISH PRISON SYSTEM 152 (1971). 
 43. See generally ALLISON MORRIS & HENRI GILLER, UNDERSTANDING 
JUVENILE JUSTICE (1987); ANTHONY M. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE 
INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY 9-10 (1969); DAVID S. TANENHAUS, JUVENILE 
JUSTICE IN THE MAKING 3-22 (2004). 
 44. Ann Skelton, Restorative Justice as a Unifying Force for Child Justice 
Theory and Practice, UNICEF http://www.unicef.org/tdad/4annskelton.pdf (last 
visited July 21, 2011). The court was first manned by two women, Jane Adams and 
Florence Kelley. One of the first probation officers at the court was also a woman: 
Ida Barnett Wells. Its first woman judge, Mary Bartelme, adjudicated girls’ cases 
from 1913 and was appointed as the presiding judge for the Chicago Juvenile 
Court in the 1920s.  Bernardine Dohrn, All Ellas: Girls Locked Up, 30 FEMINIST 
STUD. 302, 302 (2004). 
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differently due to their youth.45 Under the principle of parens 
patriae, parental control was substituted by state control, the 
rationale being that the state would act in the child’s best interests 
and would thereby enhance the child’s welfare.46 In 1891, a 
probation system was developed in Massachusetts in which criminal 
courts were required to appoint probation officers in cases involving 
children.47 In 1899, the Illinois Juvenile Court Act was embodied 
with the theme that neglected, dependent, and delinquent children 
should all be dealt with in a separate children’s court.48  A juvenile 
court was thus established and with the inception of the court, “a 
sympathetic judge could now use his discretion to apply 
individualized treatments to rehabilitate children, instead of 
punishing them.”49 According to Zimring, the juvenile court system 
was the “most successful of American legal innovations.”50  The 
juvenile court’s reaction to the problem of delinquency was viewed 
not as “punishment” but as “treatment,” and an expert juvenile court 
judge, social service personnel, clinicians and probation officers 
would all work together to find a treatment plan suitable for a 
particular child’s needs.51 The “rehabilitative ideal” thus required that 
the juvenile court look at the social and economic background of 
every child it was dealing with.52 As Odhiambo says, “the juvenile 
court would involve itself with the issue of ‘what had to be done in 
 
 45. Odhiambo, supra note 10, at 24 (citing Deborah L. Mills, United States v. 
Johnson: Acknowledging the Shift in the Juvenile Court System From 
Rehabilitation to Punishment, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 903, 904-05 (1996)). 
 46. Odhiambo, supra note 10, at 25. 
 47. David S. Tanenhaus, The Evolution of Juvenile Courts in the Early 
Twentieth Century, in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 42, 47 (Margaret K. 
Rosenheim et al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter Tanenhaus, The Evolution of Juvenile 
Courts]. 
 48. Skelton Thesis, supra note 31, at 259. 
 49. See Tanenhaus, The Evolution of Juvenile Courts, supra note 47, at 42 
(describing the juvenile court in Illinois, which lacked many important features 
added later, including private hearings, confidential records, the complaint system, 
detention homes, and probation officers). 
 50. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE xi (2005) (noting 
that the American model for the juvenile court is used as the basis for juvenile 
courts in legal systems throughout the world). 
 51. Odhiambo, supra note 10, at 22. 
 52. CLAIRE BREEN, THE STANDARD OF THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: A 
WESTERN TRADTION IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW 195 (2002). 
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the child’s interests’ and not that of guilt in a strict sense.”53 As 
summed up by Feld, the juvenile court, by virtue of the doctrine of 
parens patriae, placed emphasis on treatment, supervision and 
control rather than on punishment and allowed the state to intervene 
affirmatively in the lives of more young offenders.54 Reformatories 
and industrial schools were founded to which children could be 
referred.55 Early reformers stressed the responsibility of the state 
towards its children and although this has been criticized for over-
reliance on institutionalization, Feld describes the reforms as 
important because they insisted on the separation of child and adult 
offenders and also recognized the interconnectedness of delinquency 
and neglect.56  
With a focus on looking at children as immature because of their 
age, welfarism did not regard children as rational or self-determining 
agents.57 Such a view was also based on the moral intellectual 
development theory in criminology, which suggests that the younger 
the actor, the less probable their behavior is to always be informed 
by a sense of right and wrong.58 However, under the welfare system, 
children were not allowed the due process safeguards of the law.59 
For example, children were not accorded procedural safeguards like 
legal representation and rules of evidence.60 The system was full of 
protectionist policies and this, coupled with extensive reliance on the 
use of institutionalization often for indeterminate periods of time, led 
to a lot of criticism of welfarism.61 Despite its rehabilitative agenda, 
 
 53.  Odhiambo, supra note 10, at 24. 
 54. BREEN, supra note 52, at 198 (citing Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court 
Meets the Principle of the Offense: Legislative Changes in Juvenile Waiver 
Statutes, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 471, 475 (1987)). 
 55. Ann Skelton, From Cook County to Pretoria: A Long Walk to Justice for 
Children, 6 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 413, 413 (2011) [hereinafter Skelton, From 
Cook County to Pretoria] (stating that sixty-four reformatories were created by 
1867 in Scotland, England, and Wales). 
    56 .    Id. at 413. 
 57. Odhiambo, supra note 10, at 24. 
 58. Id. at 25. 
 59. Id. at 26. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See, e.g., Application of Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (finding that a child’s due 
process rights, right to counsel, privilege against self-incrimination, and 
protections under the Confrontation Clause of the U.S. Constitution were violated 
when he was sentenced to a maximum of six years in a state industrial school after 
an informal hearing in which no witnesses participated, the child did not have 
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there was a violation of rights and the potential for discriminatory 
treatment in the welfare system.62 As a result, the justice model 
developed in the late 1970s and early 1980s.63   
The justice approach adopted a law and order agenda. Punishment, 
and not “treatment of offenders” was its principal ideal.64 Children 
were no longer to be regarded as immature, but as rational or self-
determining.65 Such a conceptualization of children mainly took 
ground after the celebrated 1967 decision of the U.S Supreme Court 
in In Re Gault, wherein it was declared that juveniles have a right to 
counsel and other due process rights because, “under the 
Constitution, the condition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo 
court.”66 Prior to In Re Gault, a juvenile delinquency proceeding was 
not considered a criminal proceeding and children did not need an 
attorney “because juvenile justice was intended to reform or 
rehabilitate a child rather than to punish,” despite the fact that “a 
child’s liberty is at just as much risk in a delinquency proceeding as 
an adult would be in a criminal proceeding.”67 The court eventually 
acknowledged that “departures from established principles of due 
process have frequently resulted not in enlightened procedure, but 
arbitrariness. . . .”68  In general, “the welfare model can be 
understood as one polarity on a theoretical continuum of possible 
models of regimes of juvenile justice.”69 
 
access to counsel, and the judge relied mostly on hearsay statements made by a 
probation officer). 
 62. See Odhiambo, supra note 10, at 28 (citing Nicholas Bala & Rebecca 
Jaremko Bromwich, Introduction: An International Perspective on Youth Justice, 
in JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEMS 1, 7 (Nicholas Bala et al. eds., 2002) (describing 
informal proceedings that violated the presumption of innocence and the right to 
counsel)). 
 63. Odhiambo, supra note 10, at 29. 
 64. Odhiambo, supra note 10, at 29. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Gault, 387 U.S. at 28 (Fortas, J.). 
 67. Stephen S. Schofield, 40 Years After Gault, Still Searching for True Justice 
(May 21, 2007) (unpublished term paper) (on file with The Juvenile Justice 
Foundation), available at http://janetsisk.forumup.org/about821-janetsisk.html. 
 68. Gault, 387 U.S. at 18-19. 
 69. See Odhiambo, supra note 10, at 34. See generally Thomas Crofts, The 
Rise of the Principle of Education in the German Juvenile System, 12 INT’L J. 
CHILD. RTS. 401, 401 (2004) (noting that the justice model is based on “individual 
responsibility” and focuses on punishing criminal acts while the welfare model 
focuses on intervention and the behaviors behind criminal acts). 
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As a rights culture developed in various countries, there was re-
orientation on the philosophical basis for child justice, hence the 
development of a justice model as an alternative discourse.70 This 
discourse did not regard child delinquents as victims of the 
environment in which they lived, and it gave priority to the liberty 
and agency of its individual citizens, which included children.71 In 
that regard, the justice model regarded children as “reasoning agents 
who are fully responsible for their actions and should be held 
accountable before the law.”72 As such, juvenile justice would 
therefore work to assess the degree of culpability of the individual 
child offender and apportion punishment in proportion to the offense, 
while according the full rights to due process to the individual child 
as per Gault, thereby restraining the power of the state.73 Priority was 
given to suppression and deterrence of policies, and this was 
strengthened by the just deserts emphasis that gave academic 
legitimacy to punishment. 74 In line with the “just deserts” 
philosophy, child justice entails the balancing of the need to protect 
society against criminal behavior on the one hand and the need to 
pay special attention to the personal circumstances of the child 
offender on the other hand.75 Bearing in mind the free will endowed 
on each individual, the focus is not on how to protect the best 
interests of the child but on retribution as the primary goal of justice 
for purposes of ensuring the protection of society.76 In summation, 
under the welfare model, the state, as parens patriae, was 
responsible for the “immature” and “innocent” child, whose best 
interest had to be protected, whereas under the justice model, the 
capacity of the child to commit crime and thus bear the consequences 
of his actions was affirmed.77  
The principle set forth in Gault offers only limited procedural 
safeguards to delinquent youth.78 The main criticism of the juvenile 
 
 70. Odhiambo, supra note 10, at 29. 
 71. Id. at 29-30. 
 72. Id. at 30. 
 73. Id. 
 74. GORDON BAZEMORE & MARA SCHIFF, JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM AND 
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 9 (2005). 
 75. Odhiambo, supra note 10, at 31. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Odhiambo, supra note 10, at 33 (citing BARRY KRISBERG, JUVENILE 
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court was that it still reflected some elements of parens patriae, and 
so it did not totally mirror its regular or adult counterpart in that it 
failed to fully extend the applicable due process rights to criminal 
trials of juveniles, thereby limiting the range of procedural rights to 
which children were entitled and subjecting them to “the worst of 
both worlds” in the process.79 As a result, in the late 1980s, diversion 
of child offenders became common as an alternative to incarceration 
in many western jurisdictions.80  
Singer says that “it is difficult to gauge the needs of juveniles 
within a criminal justice system because that system is geared 
towards adult offenders.”81 He continues to say that the stated intent 
of juvenile justice was never just to provide a second chance but also 
to provide rehabilitative treatment, which refers to a system of 
dealing with the emotional, psychological, or sociological factors 
that lead individuals to commit serious acts of violence.82 According 
to Singer, a rehabilitative-treatment ideology makes sense in a 
system of juvenile justice where something is done to deal with 
whatever troubled behavior led to an act of delinquency or crime.83  
At the heart of the justice model is the United States of America, 
which, together with Somalia, has not ratified the CRC.84 As Skelton 
 
JUSTICE: REDEEMING OUR CHILDREN 57 (2005)). 
 79. Id. 
 80. This led to views of corporatism as a third model of juvenile justice, which 
did not gain much significance as a theory. See John Pratt, Corporatism: The Third 
Model of Juvenile Justice, 29 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 236, 245 (1989) (identifying a 
new model of juvenile justice found in advanced welfare societies in which “the 
capacity for conflict and disruption is reduced by centralization of policy, 
increased government intervention, and the co-operation of various professional 
and interest groups”). 
 81. See Simon I. Singer, Youthful Offender Status and the Reproduction of 
Juvenile Justice Within Systems of Criminal Justice: The Case of William 
Shrubsall, 17 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 107, 116 (1999) (arguing that a seventeen-year-
old who murdered his mother and was initially identified as a criminal, but was 
later given a youthful offender status without any rehabilitation or treatment, 
returned to violent crimes later in life because of the failure to address the 
underlying causes of his crime). 
 82. Id. at 108. 
 83. Id. at 118-19. 
 84. The United States and Somalia signed the treaty in 1995 and 2002 
respectively. Among other things, the United States’s reasoning for not ratifying 
the treaty is based on “right-wing” concerns bordering on fears that the CRC’s 
provisions potentially disempower parents in the upbringing of their children and 
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says, the most concerning feature of the law and order agenda for 
children in the United States’ criminal justice system has been the 
tendency to include increasing numbers of children in the adult 
criminal justice system, referred to as a “waiver,” of the jurisdiction 
of the juvenile court.85  As a result, there has been a radical shift from 
a focus on the “needs” of the child to the “deeds” of the child, 
because the system is offense-driven,86 thereby ignoring the 
differences in development, maturity, capacity, and culpability 
between children and adults.87 In trying children as adults, children 
are subject to minimum sentences which  places the American 
criminal justice system at odds with international standards.88 A case 
in point is that of State v. Pittman where a thirty year sentence, the 
minimum sentence for murder in South Carolina, was given to 
Pittman, who was twelve-years-old when he committed murder.89 
Although Pittman’s convictions were vacated on July 27, 2010 when 
the Court of Common Pleas for the Sixth Judicial Circuit90 granted 
Pittman post-conviction relief based on the fact that his Counsel was 
constitutionally ineffective for failing to pursue a plea agreement 
where Pittman could have pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter and 
potentially received a lighter sentence,91 the system of trying children 
 
undermine the family. Susan Kilbourne, U.S. Failure to Ratify the U.N. 
Convention on the Rights of the Child: Playing Politics with Children’s Rights, 6 
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 437, 438-41 (1996). 
 85. Skelton Thesis, supra note 31. 
 86. See generally PATRICK GRIFFIN ET AL., TRYING JUVENILES AS ADULTS IN 
CRIMINAL COURT: AN ANALYSIS OF STATE TRANSFER PROVISIONS 17 (1998) 
(describing the conditions for waiver, including mandatory waiver in some states 
or statutory exclusion from juvenile court jurisdiction for certain offenses and 
under specified conditions). 
 87. See Barry C. Feld, Rehabilitation, Retribution and Restorative Justice: 
Alternative Conceptions of Juvenile Justice, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE FOR 
JUVENILES: REPAIRING THE HARM OF YOUTH CRIME 17, 32 (G. Bazemore & L. 
Walgrave eds., 1999) (arguing that the developmental and psychological 
differences between children and adults affects children’s ability to make sound 
judgments). 
 88. Johan D. Van der Vyver, International  Standards for the Promotion and 
Protection of Children’s Rights: American and South African Dimensions, 15 
BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 81, 84 (2009). 
 89. State v. Pittman, 647 S.E.2d 144, 151-53 (S.C. 2007). 
 90. Pittman v. South Carolina, No. 07-CP-12-00444, at 40 (S.C. Ct. Com. Pl. 
6th Jud. Cir. Aug. 4, 2010) (order granting applicant’s petition for post-conviction 
relief). 
 91. Id. at 40. 
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as adults and subjecting them to minimum sentences still stands.92 In 
other jurisdictions, the law is more progressive in terms of minimum 
sentences for children. For example, in South Africa, the 
Constitutional Court has held in the case of S v. B that “the minimum 
sentencing regime limits the discretion of sentencing officers by 
orienting them away from non-custodial options, by interfering with 
the individualization of sentences, and by giving rise to longer prison 
sentences.”93 The court, however, stated that the traditional aims of 
punishment for child offenders have to be re-appraised in the light of 
international instruments.94 However, following this decision, the 
Criminal Law (Sentencing) Amendment Act 38 of 2007 was passed, 
reinstating minimum sentences for sixteen and seventeen-year-olds. 
This was challenged by the Centre for Child Law and, the case 
having gone through the High Court95 and the Constitutional Court, 96  
the Criminal Law Amendment Act (as amended) was declared to be 
invalid to the extent that it included sixteen and seventeen-year-olds. 
Justice Cameron reasoned that “the Constitution draws this sharp 
distinction between children and adults not out of sentimental 
considerations, but for practical reasons relating to children’s greater 
physical and psychological vulnerability.”97 This vulnerability 
therefore merits consideration when handling children in the justice 
system. Thus, minimum sentences are not applicable to children 
below the age of eighteen in South Africa.  
Perhaps, the difficulty with the United States is that it has a limited 
acceptance of children’s rights, having not ratified the CRC. As such, 
it is not easy to see child offenders through the prism of international 
human rights for children. However, positive changes are taking 
place in the child justice system of the United States. Having 
abolished capital punishment for children (under eighteen years of 
age) in 2005 in the popular case of Roper v. Simmons,98 the Supreme 
 
 92. See GRIFFIN, supra note 86, at 1 (stating that all states allow the criminal 
prosecution of juveniles as adults under certain circumstances). 
 93. Skelton, From Cook County to Pretoria, supra note 55, at 424. 
 94. Brandt v. State 2004 (513/2003) SA 1 (SCA) at ¶ 13-15 (S. Afr.). 
 95. Centre for Child Law v Minister of Justice and Others 2008 JOL 22687 (T) 
(S. Afr.). 
 96. Centre for Child Law v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 
and Others 2009  (2) SACR 477 CC (S. Afr.). 
 97. Id. ¶ 26. 
 98. 543 U.S. 551, 575-78 (2005). 
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Court has recently abolished life sentences for children without the 
possibility of parole for non-homicide cases as impermissible under 
the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishment clause in 
Graham v. Florida.99 The court had recourse to the judgments of 
other nations and the international community and considered the 
absence of such sentences in other countries, the United States being 
the only nation that imposed this type of sentence.100 Perhaps, this 
reference to the international community, which by the way has 
ratified the CRC which prohibits life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole and the death penalty for children,101 is evidence 
that the United States will soon be ascribing to the international 
framework for child justice.  
 
 
II. THE INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR 
CHILD JUSTICE 
The General Assembly of the United Nations by its Resolution 
44/25 of November 20, 1989, adopted the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child102 (“CRC” or the “Convention”), which has come to be 
described not only as “a landmark for children and their rights,”103 
but also as a “widely acclaimed and almost universally endorsed 
Convention.”104 In the words of Michael Freeman, the CRC is a 
“landmark in the history of childhood.”105 The CRC “constitutes a 
common reference point against which progress can be measured and 
results compared.”106 For example, one of its distinctive features is 
 
 99. Graham v. Florida, No. 08-7412, slip op. at 31-32 (U.S. May 17, 2010). 
 100. Id. at 29, 31. This approach of referring to other countries has been used 
before in Eighth Amendment cases. See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 575-78. 
 101. CRC, supra note 9, art. 37(a). 
 102. Id. art. 3. 
 103. Fact Sheet No. 10, The Rights of the Child, OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR 
HUM. RTS., http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet10Rev.1en. 
pdf (last visited July 21, 2011). 
 104. MICHAEL FREEMAN, THE MORAL STATUS OF CHILDREN: ESSAYS ON THE 
RIGHTS OF THE CHILD  2 (1997). 
 105. Michael Freeman, Introduction: Children as Persons, in CHILDREN’S 
RIGHTS: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 1 (Michael Freeman ed., 1996) [hereinafter 
Freeman, Introduction]. 
 106. Marta Santos Pais, A Vision for Children: The Convention on the Rights of 
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that its monitoring and implementation by the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child (the “Committee”) gave rise to a new model of 
implementation called the General Measures of Implementation.107 It 
is said that the CRC constitutes a true challenge for the States 
because unlike many other international instruments, besides 
requiring legislative amendments and institutional adjustments, it 
also requires the adoption of and adjustment to a child rights oriented 
philosophy.108 Freeman rightly points out that “it would be wrong to 
assume that the CRC is itself the last word on children’s rights.”109  
This is evidenced by the adoption of the African Charter on the 
Rights and Welfare of the Child (“ACRWC” or the “Children’s 
Charter”)110 which, as a regional treaty, has been described, in 
comparison with others, as a pioneering treaty and “the most 
progressive of the treaties on the rights of the child.”111 But how did 
this journey start and how has this philosophy been adopted in line 
with child justice? 
Prior to the CRC’s adoption, the international community adopted 
the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile 
Justice (the “Beijing Rules”),112 which provided a very significant 
basis for the development of child justice. Immediately after the 
 
the Child, in THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FIFTY YEARS AND 
BEYOND 131, 132 (Yael Danieli et al. eds., 1999). 
 107. C.R.C., General Measures of Implementation, supra note 29, ¶ 2. The 
general measures are: non-discrimination (Art. 2), respect for the views of the child 
(Art. 12), the best interest of the child (Art. 3) and the right to life (Art. 6). Id. at ¶ 
12. 
 108. See Making Children’s Rights Work in North Africa: Country Profiles on 
Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia, INTERNATIONAL CHILDREN RIGHTS 
BUREAU (Mar. 2007), http://www.e-joussour.net/en/node/474  (last visited  Aug. 4, 
2011) (arguing that implementing and following the CRC is a “continuous and 
long-term exercise” that is made easier through the sharing of successful measures 
and experiences among states with similar circumstances). 
 109. Freeman, Introduction, supra note 105, at 4. 
 110. Organization of African Unity [O.A.U.], African Charter on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child, 1990, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (entered into force 
Nov. 29, 1999) [hereinafter African Charter]. 
 111. See GERALDINE VAN BUEREN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE RIGHTS 
OF THE CHILD 402 (1995) (describing the unique features of the Charter, such as its 
focus on the rights and duties of individuals and its advanced system of 
implementation via an independent committee). 
 112. See G.A. Res. 40/33, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 96, U.N. Doc 
A/RES/40/33 (Nov. 29, 1985) (providing a guide for states to promote juvenile 
welfare and minimize the necessity of intervention by the juvenile justice system). 
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CRC’s adoption, the UN Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile 
Delinquency (the “Riyadh Guidelines”),113 and the UN Rules for the 
Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty (the “JDL 
Rules”),114 were adopted in 1990 thereby enriching the international 
justice system for children. In 1997, the UN Economic and Social 
Council adopted the UN Guidelines for Action on Children in the 
Criminal Justice System.115 Among other things, these rules and 
guidelines provide for the circumstances under which children can be 
deprived of their liberty and the conditions under which they should 
be kept while respecting children’s human rights.116 
In 1989, the CRC revolutionized children’s rights, and the area of 
child justice was significantly altered.117 Over the centuries, there has 
been a clear move from the doctrine of parens patriae which by and 
large entrusted parents with rights over their children, and the State 
as the ultimate guardian of children.118 In many cases, young people 
in the child justice system are generally viewed only in the narrow 
perspective as law breakers and a threat to the public.119 However, 
children are now a subject of human rights and law rather than an 
object of it.120 This has therefore led to the emergence of a rights-
based model of child justice. As is required of Article 40(3) of the 
CRC, a “juvenile justice system” requires the institution of separate 
laws, procedures, and institutions that apply specifically to children 
as opposed to adults.121 “By acknowledging children as bearers of 
certain minimum universally agreed standards that have now 
crystallized as children’s human rights, the CRC and other 
 
 113. See G.A. Res. 45/112, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 68, U.N. Doc 
A/RES/4/112 (Dec. 14, 1990) (creating a partnership between young persons and 
society by emphasizing socialization, education, and life in the family and the 
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 114. See G.A. Res. 45/113, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 68, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/45/113 (Dec. 14, 1990) (ensuring that juvenile imprisonment only be used 
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 115. E.S.C. Res. 1997/97, U.N. Doc. E/RES/1997/97 (Jan. 23, 1997). 
 116. Id. at 87-88. 
 117. Odhiambo, supra note 10, at 45 (citing VAN BUEREN, supra note 108, at 
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 119. Id. at 8. 
 120. Id. at 4. 
 121. CRC, supra note 9, at art. 40(3). 
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international norms on the rights of the child stand firmly in the 
theoretical justification of any issue regarding the child,” including 
child justice.122 Odhiambo argues that “by placing juvenile justice 
laws on this continuum, devoid of children’s rights discourse, a 
number of violations of children’s rights have been inevitable.”123 
Thus, the children’s rights model comes as an “alternative theoretical 
basis through which child justice can now be viewed, both in light of 
the CRC and other “soft law” derived from child justice 
instruments.”124 Olowu also attests to the fact that the adoption of the 
CRC, “signaled the beginning of an era of concrete efforts by nations 
of the modern world to give legal recognition and protection to the 
rights of children, although the subject had been on the international 
agenda since shortly after the First World War.”125 
When the CRC first came into force, it established a framework 
for sweeping changes in the way children’s rights were recognized 
across the world.126  The fact that “children’s rights have come full 
circle, at least in principle” and “the notion that children have rights 
is no longer an issue of debate or contention” is a common 
understanding.127 The CRC heralded a critical shift in perspectives on 
children, from victims and recipients of welfare to individual rights 
holders. 128 
There have been a number of Declarations and Resolutions 
concerning children’s rights and wellbeing.129 Thus, in the 
development of child rights, there have been three significant phases 
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 123. Id. at 7. 
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 126. AFR. CHILD POLICY FORUM, supra note 13, at 4. 
 127. Id. at 4. 
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POLL OF CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN EASTERN AND SOUTHERN AFRICA 6 (2006), 
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 129. See Julia Sloth-Nielsen, Children’s Rights and the Law in African Context: 
An Introduction, in CHILDREN’S RIGHTS IN AFRICA: A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 3 (Julia 
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Law] (referring to those Declarations and Resolutions adopted by the OAU/African 
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from the beginning of the last century to the present,130 starting with 
the adoption of the Geneva Declaration on the Rights of the Child by 
the League of Nations in 1924, also known as the beginning of “the 
formal establishment of an international movement for children’s 
rights.”131 This phase was followed by the adoption of the 
Declaration on the Rights of the Child in 1959, and the International 
Year of the Child in 1979 to celebrate the Declaration’s twentieth 
anniversary.132 Also in 1979, the drafting of the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child began, which was finally adopted in 1989 by the 
UN General Assembly.133 Now, the development of children’s rights 
is in its third phase, where the focus is on implementation, 
accountability, and monitoring of the CRC following its 
unprecedented and near universal ratification, which demonstrates 
the global commitment to the rights of children as a basis for 
action.134 “One of the most innovative features of the CRC is the 
emphasis on children’s right to participate, to be heard, and to have 
their views considered.”135 Following the Beijing Rules,136 the CRC 
has now made diversion practices a binding feature of child justice 
systems. Diversion, which refers to “the process of channeling 
children away from the formal criminal justice systems and can take 
place at any stage of the criminal procedure, is now universally seen 
 
 130. AFR. CHILD POL’Y FORUM, IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: 
HARMONISING LAWS IN EASTERN AND SOUTHERN AFRICA 11 (2007), available at 
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 131. ALISON M.S. WATSON, THE CHILD IN POLITICAL ECONOMY: A PLACE AT 
THE TABLE 17 (2009). 
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Soon after the CRC’s adoption, there was a World Summit on Children in 
September 1990, which had the effect of enhancing a record number of 
ratifications of the CRC. 
 134. See AFR. CHILD POLICY FORUM, supra note 13, at 2; see also Convention 
on the Rights of the Child: Frequently Asked Questions, UNICEF (Feb. 10, 2006), 
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as an integral aspect of the rehabilitative and reintegrative parts of 
each and every child justice system.”137 The idea of having a system 
dealing with child offenders can be traced back to the 1924 
Declaration which provided that a “delinquent child must be 
reclaimed.”138 The 1924 Declaration recognizes that “mankind owes 
to the Child the best that it has to give,” and provides five 
principles.139 Similarly, the 1959 Declaration reaffirms that “mankind 
owes to the child the best it has to give.”140 Principle 2 of the 
Declaration states that “the child shall enjoy special protection, and 
shall be given opportunities and facilities, by law and by other 
means, to enable him to develop physically, mentally, morally, 
spiritually and socially in a healthy and normal manner and in 
conditions of freedom and dignity.”141 “In the enactment of laws for 
this purpose, the best interests of the child shall be the paramount 
consideration.”142  
III.THE REGIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR CHILD 
JUSTICE IN AFRICA 
Member states of the Organization of African Unity (“OAU”) 
adopted a Declaration on the Rights and Welfare of the African 
Child in 1979,143 which recognized the need to take all appropriate 
measures to promote and protect the rights and welfare of the 
African child. This formed the basis for the African Charter on the 
Rights and Welfare of the Child (“ACRWC”),144 which was adopted 
in 1990 by the Assembly of Heads of State of the then OAU and 
which entered into force in 1999.145 Although inspired by trends in 
the UN system, the ACRWC prides itself on its “African perspective 
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of rights,”146 and rather than replacing the existing standards in the 
CRC, it adds to them.147  It was intended to be a complementary 
mechanism to that of the UN in order to enhance the enjoyment of 
the rights of children in Africa.148 Its conceptualization of the rights 
and welfare of the African child takes into consideration the virtues 
of the African cultural heritage, historical background, and the values 
of the African civilization.149 Such a focus on African children is 
important because in many respects, “children are more likely to be 
victims of human rights violations than adults, and African children 
are more likely to be victims than children on other continents.”150   
Causes of human rights violations in Africa, such as poverty, 
HIV/AIDS, warfare, famine, and harmful cultural practices have a 
disproportionate impact on the continent’s children.151 However, 
since the entry into force of the ACRWC, considerable progress has 
been made towards making children’s rights visible in a variety of 
domains on the continent.152 As a regional treaty, the ACRWC has 
been described, in comparison with others, as a pioneering treaty and 
“the most progressive of the treaties on the rights of the child.”153 
The CRC and the ACRWC are bringing about a paradigm shift in 
attitudes and understanding of child rights.154 The challenge is to 
translate the provisions in the charters into concrete improvements in 
children’s day-to-day lives.155 African states need to ensure that they 
move away from seeing the provisions as standards to aspire 
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towards, to operational obligations.156 
Like the CRC,  the ACRWC is a comprehensive instrument that 
sets out rights and defines universal principles and norms for the 
status of children.157  The ACRWC and the CRC are the only 
international and regional human rights treaties that cover the whole 
spectrum of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights.158 
Both the ACRWC and the CRC define a child as a human being 
under the age of eighteen,159 although the CRC goes further to say 
unless majority is attained earlier under the law applicable to the 
child.160 In view of the divergent criminal justice systems in Africa, 
having a definitive age for children under the ACRWC is applauded 
as commendable.161 It is a second global and first regional binding 
instrument that identifies the child as a possessor of certain rights 
and makes it possible for the child to assert those rights in domestic 
proceedings.162 The Charter therefore adopts a holistic approach to 
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issues relating to the rights and welfare of the child by affirming the 
principle that rights are indivisible and interdependent.163 Article 4(1) 
of the ACRWC takes a more comprehensive approach to the 
protection of children’s rights by making the best interests principle 
under the Charter, whereas the CRC regards the principle as “a 
primary consideration,” meaning that other considerations are 
equally determinant.164 The lower standard in the CRC has been 
interpreted as a procedural fairness requirement.165 
Children in most African countries constitute fifty percent of the 
population,166 and in recent years, there has been a lot of creation of 
children’s rights and law across the continent.167 Until recently, most 
African juvenile justice systems were modeled on the ideology of the 
justice-welfare model as they existed at the time of reception of these 
laws.168 In recent years, domestication of children’s rights across the 
continent continues to take place at different paces and in varied 
fashions. While some states elaborate children’s rights in African 
constitutions, others do not.169 Further, some states have enacted 
children’s laws either covering both welfare and justice of children in 
one statute or separately. For example, the South African 
constitutional clause pertaining to children’s rights has been “hailed 
as the most extensive constitutional protection for children 
anywhere,” while the first comprehensive children’s act on the 
continent was adopted in Uganda in 1996.170 According to Sloth-
Nielsen, “these endeavours have the aim of reshaping the colonial 
heritage, of modernizing and synthesizing child law, and of 
domesticating international human rights standards, and of targeting 
especially vulnerable groups of children for enhanced protection.”171 
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This protection is as important when the child is in conflict with the 
law, as it is when his welfare is in jeopardy. The modernization of 
laws in Africa has seen a lot of cross-border fertilization, which has 
most extensively been in the field of child justice both from the 
programmatic and legislative points of view.172 Successful child 
justice reforms have been introduced in many African jurisdictions, 
with a “growing continental emphasis on diversion and alternative 
programmatic responses to children in conflict with the law,”173 
which has seen the incorporation of restorative justice as an 
important element of a comprehensive child justice regime.174 
In 2000, Steiner and Alston described the African regional human 
rights system as “the newest, the least developed or effective. . .the 
most distinctive and the most controversial.”175 However, the African 
regional system for the protection of children’s rights has been hailed 
as the most progressive achievement of all regional systems, as it is 
the only system to provide a comprehensive mechanism for the 
protection and promotion of children’s rights at a regional level, 
which is an innovation in the arena of children’s rights.176  
The ACRWC stresses the need to consider African cultural 
peculiarities in matters relating to the rights of children.177 Many 
scholars have rightly observed that the ACRWC offers a higher level 
of protection than that offered by the CRC.178 The ACRWC 
recognizes children as direct bearers of rights who in turn bear 
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responsibilities to others.179 Its monitoring body, the African 
Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 
(“ACERWC”), has an extensive mandate to ensure state parties 
comply with their treaty obligations.180 The ACEWRC can receive 
state reports, individual communications as well as conduct ad hoc 
missions and onsite visits to states considered to be violating their 
treaty obligations and it also has standing before the African Court of 
Human and People’s Rights.181 The ACRWC, so far ratified by forty-
five out of the fifty-three African nations, is a combination of the 
values of the CRC and the African historical and cultural values, 
drafted due to the fact that some of the CRC provisions are vague 
because the CRC had to satisfy the culturally diverse international 
community involved in its drafting.182 The preamble to the ACRWC 
reaffirms the proclamations of the 1979 Declaration and explicitly 
recognizes that the child in Africa “occupies a unique and privileged 
position in society.”183  
The ACRWC’s juvenile justice provisions are similar to those in 
the CRC and in certain respects the CRC provides for more 
obligations than the Charter, such as the express provision on 
diversion (Article 40(3)), which is not similarly included in the 
ACRWC (Article 17).184 In Article 5, which provides for the inherent 
right to life, the ACRWC prohibits the death penalty for crimes 
committed by children,185 but is silent regarding its position on life 
imprisonment.186 This omission is unfortunate because contemporary 
human rights law establishes that life imprisonment without a 
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possibility of release is unacceptable for children.187  
Article 17 of the ACRWC incorporates a number of basic 
principles on which a juvenile justice system should be based. A 
child accused or found guilty of a crime is entitled to “special 
treatment in a manner consistent with the child’s sense of dignity and 
worth and which reinforces the child’s respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms of others.”188 Chirwa’s analysis of Article 17 
is that it breaks new ground for the protection of children’s rights in 
three respects.189 In the first place, it provides for the speedy 
determination of matters involving children.190 Secondly, unlike the 
CRC, Article 17(3) expressly and clearly provides that reformation 
and re-integration of the child must be the essential aim of treatment 
of the child during trial and after conviction. This strengthens the 
contention that “rehabilitation is a right of every prisoner.”191 
Thirdly, Article 17(2)(c)(iii) guarantees every child the right to be 
afforded legal and other appropriate assistance in the preparation and 
presentation of his defense.192 Again, as observed by Chirwa, “this 
formulation is not qualified in any way and finds no comparison in 
any other human rights instrument.”193  Another safeguard in Article 
17 is that the press and the public are prohibited from the trial of a 
child, although this has been described as a weakness for its effect of 
preventing human rights violations from being exposed.194 However, 
the strictness of the child’s privacy is more in the best interests of the 
child than is the need for exposing human rights violations through 
the media.195 Needless to say, the exposure of the violations can still 
be achieved without the media necessarily being present at trial and 
divulging the identity of the child. South Africa provides a good 
example of ensuing the right to privacy regarding the identity of 
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child offenders as seen in the case of DPP KZN v. P,196 where a 
twelve-year-old girl was convicted of her grandparent’s murder, but 
her identity has remained private to date.197 Article 17 also provides 
that children be “separated from adults in their place of detention or 
imprisonment.”198 The importance of this provision cannot be 
emphasized enough as it is a significant problem in Africa, as seen in 
the case of Evance Moyo described at the beginning of this paper. 
Amongst its weaknesses, the ACRWC does not provide for 
alternative measures of dealing with children to criminal proceedings 
nor does it say that imprisonment of the child must be used as a 
measure of last resort and for the shortest period of time.199 It also 
does not discuss the importance of protecting children from the 
adverse effects of criminal proceedings and sanctions and it does not 
reiterate all rights surrounding the administration of justice, 
especially those in the ICCPR.200 For state parties that ratified the 
ICCPR, perhaps the omission does not really have much effect on 
them, as they are bound by the provisions of the ICCPR when it 
comes to these rights. 
Both the CRC and the African Children’s Charter impose two 
general obligations on states: to adopt legislation and to formulate 
and implement other measures to realize children’s rights.201 The 
CRC is the primary instrument that guides the development of child 
justice and it is “seen as the overarching framework for a child rights 
approach.”202 According to the Committee, many States parties still 
have a long way to go in achieving full compliance with the CRC 
when it comes to child justice.203 Of concern are areas of procedural 
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rights, the development and implementation of alternative measures 
to judicial proceedings, and the use of deprivation of liberty only as a 
measure of last resort.204 The ACRWC, as the regional framework for 
children’s rights, is more limited in scope than the CRC with regard 
to child justice, but it contains provisions that pave the way for 
restorative practices and policies in child justice. 205 
IV.RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 
Many countries have been able to mandate the use of restorative 
justice processes for significant proportions of juvenile justice.206 By 
the mid-1990s, restorative justice had become popular in a number of 
jurisdictions in the United States due to its focus on reparation of 
harm, and the extent to which communities increase their capacity to 
respond to crime and conflict, which offers a broader framework that 
challenges the role of punishment and treatment as the primary 
currencies of intervention.207 Zehr, one of the premier scholars of 
restorative justice,208  identifies three basic principles that guide 
restorative justice: (1) crime is a violation of people and of 
interpersonal relationships, (2) violations create obligations, and (3) 
the central obligation is to put right the wrongs.209 
The restorative agenda provides a distinctive new standard for 
gauging intervention success that has apparently been perceived as 
neither soft on crime nor supportive of expanded punishment.210 
While agreeing with advocates of rehabilitation and treatment in 
affirming the need to actively respond to a range of problems that 
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may be related to offending, restorative justice goes further to insist 
that the complex problems of youth crime and deviant behavior 
cannot be resolved by policies based on offender-driven services 
alone.211 As such, restorative justice principles have implications for 
redefining the role of boundaries of juvenile justice and providing a 
new continuum for gauging the success of juvenile justice reform.212 
Restorative justice views intervention as a community agenda to be 
achieved through government and community action.213 Other 
principles of restorative justice have been identified as healing, 
participation, and government and community responsibility.214 In 
the same vein, values of restorative justice are: amends, assistance, 
collaboration, empowerment, encounter, inclusion, moral education, 
protection, reintegration, and resolution.215 More than anything else, 
the principles and values are consistent with dealing with children 
and preparing them to be responsible citizens, bearing in mind that 
they are still developing mentally.216  
Restorative justice emphasizes recovery of the victim through 
redress, vindication, and healing and recompense by the offender 
through reparation, fair treatment and rehabilitation.217  Its methods 
include encounter, victim-offender mediation, family group 
conferencing, circles, and impact panels, and these are used in 
diversion processes.218 In making amends, restorative justice uses 
such elements as apology, changed behavior, restitution and 
generosity.219 However, restorative justice has its critics.220 Due to the 
fact that it is voluntary and non-punitive, restorative justice presents 
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problems with regard to due process rights in criminal justice, hence 
there is a danger of human rights violations in the absence of set 
standards and guidelines for restorative justice.221 This then calls for 
a broader construct of rights in criminal justice to go beyond merely 
due process rights. As noted by other scholars, “human rights such as 
dignity and equality may be enhanced through acknowledging 
responsibility in a restorative justice process . . . .”222 
Garland has remarked that “rehabilitation programmes no longer 
claim to express the overarching ideology of the [penal] system, nor 
even to be the leading purpose of any penal measure.”223 This could 
be because of the punitive nature of penal measures which in most 
cases leave those in conflict with the law in a worse off position than 
before. The United States was the leading state in the welfarist 
approach, but it has “the less admirable record of having led the way 
on increasingly retributive, tough-on-crime attitudes towards child 
offenders.”224 In order to avoid the employment of retributive 
standards on child offenders, many societies are shifting to 
restorative justice as a model for child justice.225 This is seen as a 
return to the traditional way of community care for children,226 
wherein traditional ways were used to deal with the vast majority of 
children in conflict with the law in a number of developing countries, 
especially in Africa and South-East Asia. According to Skelton and 
Sekhonyane, “a number of restorative justice writers have sought to 
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show that, although retributive crime control dominates in the West, 
if we look back far enough in our collective history, we will find a 
time when disputes belonged to the people and restitution was the 
normal resort.”227 Thus, few cases were referred to the central justice 
system and the major benefits of the traditional justice system 
included the fact that children remained with their families and their 
communities to ensure minor disruption to their lives. Skelton and 
Sekhonyane further state that traditional justice systems are generally 
restorative in nature and while they do not hold up to a critique of 
due process rights protection expected from the criminal justice 
system by western legal philosophy, “the processes are generally 
protective and healing and aim at restoring harmony in society.” 228 
This was ably discussed at the 254th meeting of the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child, where it was said that the traditional justice 
system included such components as the restoration of equilibrium in 
the community, forgiveness and reconciliation.229  It was agreed at 
the same meeting that restorative justice might be a good paradigm 
for giving life to the standards set out in the international 
instruments, because of the emphasis placed on reconciliation, rest 
and healing, on participation by the young person, family and 
community, and on the spirit of ubuntu or the community 
approach.230 Referring to arguments about the risks involved in 
traditional systems, it was said that customary law was a living 
system that could be broadened to take new standards into 
consideration.231 There were, however, challenges involved in 
integrating traditional systems: informal justice methods must 
include due process; a community-based, individualized approach 
must also achieve equality and efforts should aim at ensuring that 
culture and custom did not clash with the CRC.232 It was highlighted 
that what was in the best interests of the child was in the best 
interests of society, hence a juvenile justice system that did not 
function well failed not only the children, but society as a whole, for, 
far from protecting society, it merely generated criminals to prey 
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upon it. This 254th meeting of the Committee of the Rights of the 
Child in 1995 offers a groundbreaking discussion of the use of 
restorative justice in child justice at the international level. It is 
therefore appropriate to explore the development of restorative 
justice in international instruments at this point.  
As noted by Smith, the Vienna Declaration, published in the year 
2000 after the tenth UN Congress, is a milestone for restorative 
justice within UN paradigms.233 Preparatory UN congress reports 
noted “that the concept of restorative justice should be a fundamental 
element of discussions of accountability and fairness to offenders 
and victims in the justice process.”234 “The philosophy behind 
restorative justice was to manage the harm done and to restore the 
offender and victim to their former state as far as possible.”235 
“Restorative justice presented the criminal justice process with an 
alternative to the established modes of trial and punishment and 
sought to include the community and society as a whole in the 
restorative process.”236 It was also noted in the preparatory reports 
that, in recent years, “restorative justice had attracted the interest of 
policy makers, practitioners, researchers and individual actors in the 
criminal justice process.”237 Restorative justice “as an ancient 
practice was largely used for young offenders and less serious 
offences that had re-emerged in new forms such as mediation, family 
group conferencing and healing circles.”238 The participants 
discussed possible applications of restorative justice in cases 
involving adult offenders and more serious crimes.239 
In 2009, Resolution 10/2 on “Human Rights in the Administration 
of Justice, in Particular Juvenile Justice”240 was adopted by the UN 
Human Rights Council (“UNHRC”), which is the most recent 
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international resolution dealing with child justice.241 The Resolution 
states in paragraph 7 that “the Council recognizes that every child 
and juvenile in conflict with the law must be treated in a manner 
consistent with his or her rights, dignity and needs, in accordance 
with international law, and relevant international standards on human 
rights in the administration of justice, and calls on state parties to the 
CRC to abide strictly by its principles and provisions and to improve 
the status of information on the situation of juvenile justice.”242 Thus, 
the UNHRC underscores the importance of rights-based systems of 
justice for children in conflict with the law and Gallinetti applauds 
this as a significant development because it reaffirms the UN 
approach to children in conflict with the law as clearly provided for 
in the CRC, and also links child justice with the importance of the 
administration of justice generally, which falls under the purview of 
the UNHRC.243 Most significantly, the Resolution further encourages 
states to use of alternative measures, such as diversion and 
restorative justice and to ensure the principle that detention of 
children should be a measure of last resort and for the shortest 
appropriate period of time.244 Furthermore, states are urged to include 
rehabilitation and reintegration strategies for former child offenders 
in juvenile justice policies, and “that under their legislation and 
practices, neither capital punishment nor life imprisonment without 
the possibility of release is imposed for offences committed by 
persons below eighteen years of age.”245  
As such, as Gallinetti says, in line with the approach of UN 
Committee on the Rights of the Child, “the UNHRC emphasizes two 
key elements of an effective child justice system, namely, the use of 
alternative dispositions to the formal criminal justice system, and the 
avoidance of detention of children unless as a last resort and for the 
shortest appropriate time.”246 Accordingly, the UNHRC “should be 
commended for its decisive stance on child justice and for 
identifying the critical issues that pose challenges for criminal justice 
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systems across the world.”247 The resolution is an important addition 
to “international jurisprudence on children in the criminal justice 
system, and is welcomed as another clear statement on the need for 
domestic compliance with international norms and standards, as well 
as the proper implementation thereof.” 248 
Smith chronicles the growing interest and increased attention 
given to restorative justice constructs in UN paradigms249 and 
propounds that a transformative discourse is emerging that 
recognizes restorative justice as a human right.250 Restorative justice, 
“no longer spoken of as a possible fad or passing trend, is widely 
recognized in a variety of ways and in many contexts by most 
member states and the international community.”251 Principles of 
criminal justice and human rights collide as adversarial systems seek 
retribution. In agreeing with Smith, “while the criminal justice 
system focuses on broken laws, who is guilty and how the guilty 
should be punished, the UN is in the embryonic stages of embracing 
a restorative justice paradigm that focuses on broken relationships, 
who is in need and how well-being and social harmony may be 
restored.”252 “Restorative justice, and not just justice designed to 
punish, is being recognized as an emerging human right for victims, 
offenders and the community.”253 It is a viable response to human 
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rights violations and inadequate justice systems. In preparation for 
the 10th UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment 
of Offenders, the Secretary-General reported that “paradigm shifts 
within all facets of the criminal justice system needed to be 
addressed.” 254 “Restorative justice might be a good paradigm for 
giving life to the standards set out in the international instruments 
because of the emphasis placed on reconciliation, rest and healing, 
on participation by the young person, family and community, and on 
the spirit of ubuntu or the  community approach.”255 The Preamble to 
the Basic Principles on the Use of Restorative Justice Programmes in 
Criminal Matters256 recalls that there has been “worldwide, a 
significant growth of restorative justice initiatives” and emphasizes 
that that “restorative justice is an evolving response to crime that 
respects the dignity and equality of each person, builds 
understanding, and promotes social harmony through the healing of 
victims, offenders and communities.” The preamble also recognizes 
that that this restorative justice “provides an opportunity for victims 
to obtain reparation, feel safer and seek closure; allows offenders to 
gain insight into the causes and effects of their behaviour and to take 
responsibility in a meaningful way; and enables communities to 
understand the underlying causes of crime, to promote community 
well-being and to prevent crime.”257  However, the “retributive 
process that has traditionally focused on the offender and the State is 
seen as archaic and still too rarely resorts to non-custodial sanctions 
or other alternatives, including restorative justice.”258 Significantly, 
“the UN documents recognize a need to restore well-being and social 
harmony in the community.”259 When restorative justice is 
recognized as a human right, access to justice for victims, offenders 
and members of the community enhances the prospects for a justice 
that heals and a peace that endures.260  
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CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, it is clear that children, as a vulnerable group of 
society, have their rights curtailed from time to time, and children in 
conflict with the law experience this to a much greater extent, 
particularly children in Africa. In providing safeguards for children 
in conflict with the law, two important and progressive instruments, 
the CRC and the ACRWC, have crystallized human rights for 
children and provide for the administration of child justice. Child 
justice is a field that has undergone several theoretical shifts since 
the end of the nineteenth century. There has been a shift from an 
initial welfarist model of child justice to a justice model and then a 
children’s rights mode, and now the theory of restorative justice is at 
the helm of the child justice jurisprudential development, as 
evidenced by its incorporation in several UN documents. It is herein 
submitted that restorative justice is the best approach for dealing with 
children in conflict with the law because of its emphasis on 
reparation of harm, as children are better placed to be reformed than 
adults. Restorative justice has therefore become a model of child 
justice. 
 
